Oleksandr Monastyrskyi
Analyst in the field of countering disinformation and improving media literacy, “Independent Media” program, o.monastyrskyi@cedem.org.ua

The article was published in Detector Media

The portrayal of Ukrainian citizens being sent to the front “as cannon fodder”, the “nobility” of Russians, the bad West, American biolaboratories, and calls to take an entire region from Ukraine — these are not Russian, but Hungarian messages bombarding the people of Transcarpathia.
Hungary has never hidden its interest in Transcarpathia, as it considers supporting the diaspora a part of its state policy. However, it is worth noting that the narrative about the “Hungarianness” of Transcarpathia has never been statistically proven. According to the 2001 census, Hungarians made up about 12% of the region’s total population (approximately 150,000 people). After February 24, 2022, the number of ethnic Hungarians decreased, as many emigrated to Hungary.

Nonetheless, in a document from the Hungarian Ministry of Public Administration and Justice, the national policy of Hungary is summarized as follows: “Hungary supports Hungarian institutions and organizations abroad politically, morally, and financially, and builds direct relations with Hungarians abroad. Of course, this support cannot compensate for the disadvantages related to the economic situation of neighboring countries and the lack of prospects, but it significantly contributes to improving the conditions of education for Hungarians living in neighboring countries, the functioning of public organizations, and the preservation of cultural traditions”.

There seems to be nothing wrong with this, but the methods and messages are not always clear and do not always align with the words in official documents. Media play a role in the so-called “support” of ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia.

After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Hungary’s leadership adopted a position close to neutrality and, in certain aspects, even supported the aggressor country. Hungarian state propaganda occasionally uses pro-Russian narratives and, at times, retransmits Russian disinformation and propaganda to its citizens in order to undermine trust in the EU, the US, international organizations, and Ukraine. This includes exploiting the theme of Hungarians living in Transcarpathia.

The Role of Transcarpathia for Hungary

Ethnic Hungarian groups also live in other neighboring countries: Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Romania. Until 1918, parts of these countries’ territories (though not all were inhabited by Hungarians) belonged to the Hungarian half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After the defeat in World War I and the Treaty of Trianon, these territories were ceded to other states. The treaty also affected Transcarpathia.

Map of “Greater Hungary”

The topic of Trianon remains sensitive for Hungarians even today, which is why the idea of a “Greater Hungary” and the unification of these lands persists. There are well-known instances that suggest Viktor Orbán’s affinity for the idea of a “Greater Hungary“.

Photo of Viktor Orbán during one of the football matches of the Hungarian national team. For this match, he decided to wear a scarf with the image of the map of “Great Hungary”

In its policy toward national minorities, Budapest asserts that the Hungarian minority in other countries lacks sufficient rights for self-expression, the promotion of their identity, and culture: “Relations between the Hungarian state and neighboring countries can mainly be called good as long as the issue of Hungarians living abroad is not raised. In recent years, relations between Hungary and its neighbors have become tense primarily due to issues concerning national minorities. It cannot be denied that there have been positive changes regarding Hungarians in neighboring states, but Hungarians, although loyal citizens of these countries, feel they are in an unfavorable position, and therefore believe further expansion of rights is necessary”. This national unity policy is known as nemzetpolitika.

Orbán sees the ultimate goal of his national policy as recognizing local Hungarians as the indigenous population of the region, and granting autonomy within Transcarpathia for the minority, when referring to Ukraine.

Orbán’s regime finances and promotes its own ideology. For comparison, Russia’s spending on sponsoring and supporting the federal agency “Rossotrudnichestvo”, which absorbs 4 billion rubles or about 0.01% of Russia’s total budget, is far less than Hungary’s spending on promoting its culture and political interests — approximately 336 million euros.

The policy of national unity is multi-layered and seeks to preserve Hungarian communities outside Hungary. The ethnic Hungarians themselves do not always seek to adhere to such a policy and assimilate well in their places of residence, in particular in Transcarpathia. This diagram illustrates the principle and structure of the work of nemzetpolitika

The chart showing the percentage of media spending for Hungarians abroad compared to Hungary’s total expenditures reveals that, since 1990, investments in the media sector have significantly increased. A sharp rise is particularly noticeable after Orbán came to power in 2010.

In fact, the Hungarian state claims that ethnic Hungarians are not allowed to be Hungarian outside of their country, and Budapest is the only one capable of caring for them.

Hungarian propaganda media, controlled by Orbán’s circle of friends, promote the narrative that the civil rights of Hungarians in the region are significantly limited. Orbán, in his speeches and interviews, constantly fuels the theme of alleged humiliation and limitations on the rights of ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia. This narrative supposedly justifies Hungary’s interference in Ukraine’s affairs to protect its people.

Over the years, propaganda has created many myths about Transcarpathia. For instance, the Hungarian prime minister claimed that, as of 2020, about 200,000 Hungarians lived in the region. As we have noted, this is not true. According to journalists from European Pravda and a study by Political Capital, even before the Russian invasion, there were fewer than 100,000 Hungarians in the region, as many had left in search of a better life (and the full-scale war turned this emigration into a mass movement). Furthermore, Budapest simplified the process for ethnic Hungarians to obtain Hungarian passports, which allows them to live and work in any EU country.

As for those ethnic Hungarians who remain in Transcarpathia, they have become the target audience of Orbán’s media empire, which continues attempts to destabilize the situation in the region.

After Russia’s full-scale invasion, Hungary officially adopted a position of neutrality and declared itself a so-called “island of peace”, with Orbán positioning himself as a “promoter of negotiations and peaceful conflict resolution”.

In reality, Hungarian media began to retransmit Russian propaganda and disinformation. It is important to note that Orbán’s regime has effectively monopolized the country’s information space: the state holding MTVA is a mouthpiece for the government, major media outlets are owned by the prime minister’s allies, and loyal bloggers are funded through the Megafon program.

The majority of the market is controlled by state media, Orbán’s allied media group KESMA, and other pro-government media outlets.

Such propaganda has its consequences, as an independent survey of Hungarians revealed that 37% of people believe Ukrainians committed genocide against the Russian minority in Ukraine. The findings of the study prove that the government’s portrayal of “Hungarians abroad in danger” has made the public more receptive to conspiracy theories that Russia uses to justify its invasion.

In addition, pro-government media have repeatedly raised the issue that Ukraine is suffering due to the mistakes of the state leadership, subtly hinting at its incompetence, accusing Washington of starting the war, and calling Ukraine a “puppet state”.

The retransmission of Russian propaganda by pro-government Hungarian media undermines Ukraine’s credibility in the eyes of Hungarians and contributes to the spread of Russian disinformation campaigns and narratives aimed at legitimizing Russia and its actions in Ukrainian territory, as well as undermining our defense capabilities and trust in our state. These media outlets are also accessible to Hungarian-speaking residents of Transcarpathia, who are similarly targeted by the propaganda.

The situation is also exploited by the intelligence services of the aggressor state. In 2022, the SBU warned about Russian provocations among ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia. Minority representatives received SMS messages (the most recent incident occurred in winter 2024), claiming that Ukrainians hated them and including threats such as “to be stabbed”.

This is typical Russian tactics for inciting regional conflicts, which Russia applied even before 2022. One need only recall events from 2017 – 2018, such as when unknown individuals set fire to the office of the Hungarian Cultural Society of Transcarpathia.

Narratives Promoted by Hungary in Transcarpathia

The media landscape in Transcarpathia is exceptionally diverse, combining various publications that continually produce content for the local audience. There is a group of Ukrainian-language media outlets, such as Suspilne and private ones like Infopost. “Suspilne Uzhhorod” airs programs in Hungarian, thus promoting the inclusion of local Hungarians into the Ukrainian information context. However, there are also Hungarian pro-government media that promote narratives favorable to Orbán.

The Beacon Project’s study, “The Political Landscape of the Hungarian Minority and Hungarian Minority Media in Transcarpathia”, discusses the media space for the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia. Researchers point out that there are at least eight Hungarian-language news websites (including those linked to traditional media), as well as three Hungarian-language newspapers, one bilingual (Hungarian and Ukrainian) TV station, and one bilingual radio station.

KMKSZ (the Hungarian Cultural Society of Transcarpathia, an organization that advocates for the rights of ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia) is also the publisher of the Ukrainian-language newspaper “Carpathian Objective” and the Ukrainian-language news website ko.net.ua. While the law requires TV and radio stations to broadcast content in Ukrainian in addition to Hungarian, this rule does not apply to newspapers and news websites. The 2019 language law does not require a Ukrainian version for print media, their web versions, or news websites if they publish content in official EU languages (which include Hungarian). However, three Hungarian-language news websites voluntarily translate their content into Ukrainian, although not always fully. The issue is not only that these organizations are not violating the law de jure but also the ideas they promote and the goals they pursue. 

Table of Hungarian media in Transcarpathia, as well as local media that are in Hungarian, but registered in Ukraine

More details about the ownership structure of these media outlets can be found in the Beacon Project report. In summary, Hungary invests in media and applies “soft power” in the region through NGOs, media, and academic institutions.

Locally, this policy is implemented by organizations such as TUKZ (Hungarian Cultural Society of Transcarpathia), DSUU (Democratic Union of Hungarians of Ukraine), and various wings of these organizations, which are registered as political parties and have even run in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada. For instance, TUKZ created a political wing called the “Hungarian Democratic Party of Ukraine.” They collaborate with the Socialist Party of Hungary and previously with the Party of Regions and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc. The motives and objectives of this collaboration are not fully known, but it can be assumed that it involves promoting their own interests and brand through parties that once had media and financial resources.

Considering their cooperation with Hungarian parties and individual officials, these organizations promote Hungarian propaganda and their agenda. For example, in 2021, both organizations demanded that Hungarians be recognized as an indigenous people of Ukraine. These organizations also demand that ethnic Hungarians have the right to freely use their national symbols (flag, anthem, and coat of arms). However, such demands are unacceptable because the law clearly states that indigenous peoples are those that formed on the territory of Ukraine and do not have their own state.

Another precedent that reflects the plans and sentiments the Hungarian government seeks to spread in Transcarpathia occurred on January 28, 2023, during a meeting in Budapest of the Magyar Békekör (“Hungarian Peace Circle”). The meeting discussed the mobilization of ethnic Hungarians living in Transcarpathia into the Ukrainian Armed Forces. One of the key outcomes of the meeting was the demand to halt the mobilization of Hungarians in Ukraine. During the meeting, the phrase was uttered: “Our Hungarian brothers living in Transcarpathia are being used as cannon fodder by the Kyiv regime. They are being sent to certain death by the thousands. They are being used to protect the anti-Hungarian Ukrainian neo-Nazi government. What is happening in Transcarpathia is a massacre of Transcarpathia and the entire Hungarian people”. The organizers also called on their website for as many supporters as possible to join the protest near the Ukrainian embassy in Budapest.

It is impossible not to mention the case when Hungarian media (targeting Hungarians in Transcarpathia) spread a fake story about refrigerated trucks in a town in Transcarpathia allegedly storing the bodies of men, possibly Hungarians, who had been forcibly mobilized into the Ukrainian Armed Forces and died in battle. The material claims that members of the Wagner group sent these bodies to Transcarpathia on several buses. The publication portrays Russian soldiers as heroic military personnel who took care to send the bodies of Ukrainians back. It is clear that there were no refrigerated trucks, and the report was spread to undermine the mobilization and incite hatred.

In an article dedicated to Hungary’s information influence, analyst Andriy Avramenko from Ukraine World highlights the following narratives in the rhetoric of official Budapest:

• Genocide of Hungarians in Eastern Ukraine: Pro-government media spread the narrative that Ukraine is forcibly mobilizing ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia and sending them to fight against Russia. A similar narrative can also be found in Russian propaganda, which often claims that Ukraine is committing genocide against ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the east.
• Kyiv Junta led by the CIA: Hungarian media also promote the idea of a “Kyiv junta led by the CIA,” a common Russian narrative about the Ukrainian government. This idea closely mirrors Russian propaganda’s claim that Ukraine is under foreign control.
• Secret American-Ukrainian Biolabs: Hungarian media echoed Russian disinformation about alleged secret American-Ukrainian biological laboratories in Ukraine.

The research from The Beacon Project and IRI highlights the following categories of propaganda messages:

• The territory of Ukraine should be changed — This refers to the idea of taking Transcarpathia from Ukraine, as the government cannot guarantee sufficient rights for Hungarians and constantly hinders the development of Hungarian culture and identity.
• Hungary is the protector of traditional values — This narrative aims to portray Viktor Orbán as a defender of the traditional values inherent to the nation and culture. By contrasting his ideology with that of Brussels, as well as promoting anti-Islamic and anti-immigration ideas, the media creates the image of Hungary as a defender against the encroachment of enemies and destructive elements.
• Hungarian identity in Ukraine is misunderstood — This narrative presents the Hungarian government as caring for the Hungarian communities in Transcarpathia instead of the Ukrainian and regional authorities, while depicting Hungarian communities as highly dependent on assistance from Hungary (which has some truth to it, as the region’s economic situation has never been good, and Hungarian funding has significantly helped implement various infrastructure projects).
• Ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine should apply for Hungarian citizenship — This narrative preceded the mass issuance of Hungarian passports to ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia. This was a blatant violation of Ukrainian legislation, which establishes single citizenship (Article 4 of the Constitution of Ukraine). As a result, after February 24, 2022, most citizens of Ukraine who also held Hungarian passports left the country without any restrictions.
• Hungary is the defender of the traditional family — A narrative aligned with the idea of Viktor Orbán as the defender of Hungarians against external enemies. This narrative fits well into the concept of nemzetpolitika (national politics), where one of the key criteria for caring for the nation and diaspora is promoting marriages between ethnic Hungarians.
• The Hungarian community in Transcarpathia should be recognized as an indigenous people — This narrative aims to legitimize the expansion of rights for Hungarians in Transcarpathia: promoting their culture, ideology, and advocating for education in the Hungarian language. The ultimate goal of such activity is to secure the status of indigenous people at the legislative level and grant the community autonomous status.
• Ukraine is a failed, dysfunctional state — This is exactly the same narrative used by Russian propaganda about Ukraine, labeling it as the “404 state” and denying its right to sovereignty.

These narratives were gathered through the analysis of Facebook pages of relevant media outlets directly or indirectly funded from Budapest. The authors of the study publish the following conclusions after conducting their research: “Posts from all minority sources representing the narrative of Hungarians as a minority poorly treated had the highest total number of interactions. Posts representing the local narrative of Hungarians as an indigenous minority had the second-highest number of interactions”.

Interestingly, posts representing the narrative of Hungarian citizenship, Hungary as a defender of traditional values, and the traditional family had fewer total interactions. Overall, the narratives of the Hungarian government turned out to be less important to the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia than the local minority narratives. In fact, the narrative “Ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine should apply for Hungarian citizenship” was displaced by the local narrative advocating for the recognition of dual citizenship in Ukraine.

Media of national minorities published several stories representing the “Hungary is the defender of the traditional family” narrative. However, these materials were simply reprinted articles from Hungarian mainstream pro-government media (e.g., Hirado.hu, ORIGO). KárpátHír also published three posts representing the “Hungary is the defender of traditional values” narrative. Similarly, this media outlet reprinted materials from MTI (Hungarian state news agency). Thus, Hungary’s leading pro-government media tend to influence minority media by imposing Hungarian government narratives on them.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The analysis of sources and publications leaves a sense of “déjà vu,” as the rhetoric of Hungarian and Russian propaganda overlaps. The ultimate goal in both cases is quite clear and understandable — to sow discord among ethnic groups and escalate tensions in the region. Among the more radical segments of the political elite, calls for “Transcarpathian separatism” periodically emerge. While these calls find little support among local residents, promoting such ideas poses a threat to Ukraine’s national security. On the other hand, one should not overestimate the power of Hungarian radicals or perceive these trends as widespread.

Transcarpathia still hosts many ethnic Hungarians, who cannot be ignored. On the contrary, Ukraine should do everything possible to integrate them as fully as possible into our information space (many of them are already quite involved in it) and diminish the ethnic boundaries that have developed over years of cohabitation. Such measures will serve as an antidote to the subversive actions of Russian intelligence and Hungary’s hostile rhetoric, which seek to intensify the flames of hatred to undermine Ukraine’s defense capabilities, divide society, and divert attention from issues related to the war against Russia.

Recommendations:

1. Develop a state policy to counter disinformation and propaganda specifically tailored to the needs of the region, taking into account the tools used by Hungary and Russia to destabilize public sentiment in Transcarpathia.
2. Adapt EU legislation concerning the rights of national minorities to account for all aspects and peculiarities of Transcarpathia and the local Hungarian minority. It is important that the legislation leaves no room for ambiguity or uncertainty, as enemies could exploit such gaps to further escalate the situation in the region.
3. Study the positive and negative experiences of other countries in ensuring the inclusion of national minorities in socio-political processes.
4. Create policies aimed at integrating ethnic Hungarians into Ukraine’s informational and cultural sphere.
5. Establish a platform for dialogue between Hungarians and Ukrainians in the region.
6. Facilitate dialogue between the state, think tanks, international organizations in the region, historians, and others. They should monitor and analyze potential threats from the spread of Hungarian-Russian disinformation to provide effective recommendations for the work of Ukrainian intelligence, government, and local authorities.