This research was first published in Ukrainian on the Detector Media website 
(February 17, 2025)

RT France: From Its Establishment to European Union Sanctions

RT France Before the Sanctions. RT France, a division of the state-controlled Russian international media organization RT, commenced its broadcasting operations in France in December 2017. The channel was headquartered in Boulogne-Billancourt, France. At the time of its inception, RT France employed a workforce of 150 individuals and operated with an initial budget of €20 million. The editor-in-chief became Kseniya Fedorova.

Throughout its tenure in France, RT France encountered significant criticism from President Emmanuel Macron, was subjected to surveillance by French intelligence, and was closely monitored by the French audiovisual regulatory authority (CSA — Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel). For instance, in 2018, the CSA issued a warning to RT France following a report on Syria, citing “deficiencies in integrity, accuracy of information, and diversity of viewpoints.”

Earlier, in 2017, Emmanuel Macron had denounced RT and Sputnik for disseminating falsehoods and defamatory remarks about him during the French presidential campaign. 

During a press conference in Versailles with Vladimir Putin in 2017, Macron explicitly addressed concerns regarding RT, stating: “When media outlets spread defamatory falsehoods, they are no longer journalists; they are instruments of influence.”  He further contended that RT and Sputnik, during the French presidential election, had “not functioned as media and journalists but as entities of influence and deceptive propaganda.”

In spite of ongoing criticism and regulatory oversight, RT France persisted in its operations within France.

Implementation of EU Sanctions. On March 2, 2022, in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Union imposed sanctions on the state-run Russian propaganda outlets RT and Sputnik and suspended their broadcasting within the EU. These measures are part of the EU’s broader strategy to counter disinformation and propaganda, which Russia employs to justify its war against Ukraine and influence public opinion within the EU.. The sanctions encompass all forms of information transmission and dissemination, including cable, satellite, internet television, platforms, websites, and applications.

Response of RT France and Circumvention of Sanctions. The French division of the Russian propaganda network, RT France, initiated legal proceedings seeking to overturn the sanctions and aimed to accelerate the suspension of their enforcement. Nevertheless, the EU General Court dismissed RT France’s appeal. 

Despite the prohibition on its broadcasting within the EU, RT France persisted in generating content from its French office and distributing it to regions where the channel remained operational, including French-speaking nations in Africa. 

In January 2023, as part of the ninth EU sanctions package against Russia, which was ratified in December 2022, France froze the assets of RT France. Consequently, RT France halted its operations in the French office, although the channel continues to transmit from Moscow.

Screenshot of Ksenia Fedorova’s tweet regarding the suspension of activities due to the EU’s ninth sanctions package

In April 2023, the Commercial Court in France officially declared the bankruptcy of the French-speaking division of RT France. 

Nevertheless, RT France consistently asserted that it was a victim of “censorship” by the European Union and actively utilized circumvention strategies to sustain its presence in the European information landscape.

For example, in 2022, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue conducted an investigation into the methods by which RT’s content reached audiences within the EU following the imposition of sanctions. The research identified four categories of websites that facilitated the dissemination of RT’s content in EU nations:

1. Alternative domains and subdomains for RT, which featured various URLs redirecting to RT’s official IP addresses, along with two additional subdomains exhibiting similar traits.
2. Mirror sites of RT, which were exact replicas of the original site but hosted under different URLs. These mirror sites were indistinguishable from RT but were located on servers that could not be directly associated with RT.
3. Copy-paste websites, which completely replicated articles from RT.
4. Aggregator sites, which published only portions of RT’s articles (such as headlines, leads, or initial paragraphs) and subsequently redirected users to RT’s official sites through links to the original content.

Furthermore, in 2023, the Diderot Committee, in its report titled “La (non) mise en œuvre des sanctions européennes contre les chaines de television et entreprises de medias russes” (“(Non) Implementation of European Sanctions Against Russian TV Channels and Media Companies”), identified 52 websites operated by ANO TV Novosti, which includes RT France. Of these, 39 websites were accessible in France without the need for a VPN. Despite this accessibility, the Committee’s data indicated that the proportion of visits to RT’s French-language websites from May to July 2023 was minimal, accounting for only 0.6% of the total traffic for ANO TV Novosti, with 3.7 million visits compared to 314.1 million for the English version, 57.6 million for the Arabic version, 36.2 million for the Spanish version, and 16.8 million for the German version.

Why RT France is Important for Russian Propaganda

RT France plays a significant role in Russian propaganda efforts due to the global prominence of the French language. As highlighted in the report “La langue française dans le monde” (“The French Language in the World”), the number of French speakers was estimated at 321 million in 2022, positioning French among the top five most spoken languages worldwide, following English, Chinese, Hindi, and Spanish.

The Russian government, through its propaganda channels, including RT France, actively targets French-speaking audiences, using the French language as a tool for access to key regions. These include French-speaking Europe (France, Belgium, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Monaco), African countries where French has official status (such as Niger, the Republic of the Congo, Cameroon, Rwanda, and others), as well as Quebec in Canada, French-speaking communities in the Middle East and Latin America.

Source: report “La langue française dans le monde” (“The French Language in the World”)

Following the shutdown of RT France in April 2023, the Diderot Committee reported that the largest proportion of visits to RT France’s websites came from France (20.8%), Canada (18.9%), Sweden (5.8%), Switzerland (5.5%), and the United States (3.9%). Additionally, a considerable segment of the traffic, amounting to 44.4%, remains unidentified, likely due to the utilization of VPNs.

Source: report “La (non) mise en œuvre des sanctions européennes contre les chaines de television et entreprises de medias russes” (“(Non) Implementation of European Sanctions Against Russian TV Channels and Media Companies”)

Despite this, although RT France has started to focus more on African countries, it still maintains its focus on covering French events.

Research Findings: Availability of RT France Websites within the French and Belgian Information Environments

Official RT France Website

France, Paris. Upon entering the search term “RT” into Google, we found that there were no results that provided a direct link to the website.

The Accessibility of RT Websites in Paris, France

When trying to access the official RT France website (francais.rt.com) through the search bar, the accessibility outcomes differed based on the internet service providers. Some providers restricted access, while others permitted unrestricted entry to pages associated with official RT domains, including RT France.

Screenshot of francais.rt.com (France, Paris)

Screenshot of francais.rt.com (France, Paris)

Belgium, Brussels. Upon entering the query “RT” into the Google search engine in Belgium, the fifth search result directed us to RT France. It is important to highlight that the suggested link featured a different domain (fra.mobileapiru.com/en-direct) rather than the official domain, which will be elaborated upon in the subsequent subsection.

The Accessibility of RT Websites in Belgium, Brussels

Upon entering the official RT France domain (francais.rt.com) into the search bar, we successfully accessed the site without any restrictions. This outcome was consistent across various internet service providers in Belgium, enabling us to access the official RT websites effortlessly. Likewise, we encountered no difficulties when accessing the official RT link (rt.com).

Screenshot of francais.rt.com (Belgium, Brussels)

The verification of the available domains through the Whois resource confirms that these are indeed official RT pages, which remain accessible in Belgium despite the imposed sanctions. 

Notably, the question of RT’s accessibility in Belgium was highlighted by journalists from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in February 2024, who successfully accessed the site without a VPN directly from the building of the European Union Council in Brussels.

Consequently, the findings of the research, albeit based on a limited dataset, revealed a marked disparity in the accessibility of the RT France website between France and Belgium, as well as among various internet service providers within these nations. This variation in accessibility implies possible deficiencies in the enforcement of sanctions at both the national level and in the execution by internet providers.

Moreover, the lack of official RT pages appearing in Google search results suggests that access to this propaganda resource is restricted due to the enforcement of EU sanctions. Given that Google operates localized versions of its search engine for each country, these versions are designed to comply with local content regulations.

Alternative Domains and Mirror Sites of RT France

Russian propaganda may utilize alternative and mirror websites to circumvent restrictions on access to official RT platforms. The distinction between these two types of sites is that an alternative domain serves as a separate web address that directs users to the same content as the primary site, whereas a mirror site functions as an exact replica of the original, enabling users to access the same material even if the main site is blocked or unavailable. Mirror sites are frequently employed to bypass censorship or restrictions when access to the primary resource is limited in certain countries.

According to Reporters Without Borders (RSF), entering the term “RT en français” into Google or another search engine will typically yield the mirror site of the Russian propaganda channel in French among the top search results.

Upon searching for “RT en français” (notably, “RT” alone did not yield successful results), we were able to access the French-language RT page freely, albeit through different domains that were not the official one (though this access was inconsistent with some internet service providers). This phenomenon was observed in both the French and Belgian media landscapes.

Additionally, we identified multiple domains hosting identical content from RT France. Each of these domains was verified using the Whois service.

RT France Domains 

The primary website of RT operates under the domain rt.com, which was registered in 1991 through the registrar Regional Network Information Center, JSC dba RU-CENTER. Information pertaining to its servers, specifically ens-k.rttv.ru and ns1.rttv.ru, confirms that this domain is officially owned by RT and serves as its main platform.

The subdomain fr.rt.com is part of this same main domain. It shares the same infrastructure and servers as the main site, confirming its status as an official subdomain created specifically for French-language content.

However, other sites such as fra.mobileapiru.com and rtenfrance.tv show significant differences. Although they are registered through the same registrar (Regional Network Information Center, JSC dba RU-CENTER), their servers belong to a different infrastructure (cdnmgf.megafon.ru). This indicates that while these domains may be associated with RT, they were created for a different purpose, such as ensuring backup access to content. These sites are most likely mirror sites that reflect information from the main resource.

The domain xynovas.online, registered in October 2024 through the registrar Hosting Ukraine LLC, shows even more distinct separation. Its servers (ns11.inhostedns.com, etc.) are completely unrelated to RT’s infrastructure. This suggests that this site was created by third parties, likely as an independent mirror to bypass blocks or other access restrictions.

Thus, it can be clearly determined that rt.com and its subdomain fr.rt.com are official RT resources. Meanwhile, fra.mobileapiru.com and rtenfrance.tv are mirror sites, possibly created by the company for additional access, while xynovas.online is a mirror site with no direct connection to RT and created by third parties.

Additionally, we analyzed the traffic of these domains by country and visit count as of December 2024, utilizing SimilarWeb.

The official RT France domain demonstrates significant overall traffic, which is understandable given its accessibility in regions beyond the EU. A significant portion of its audience is located in France (27.56%), followed by Canada (16.80%) and Mexico (11.99%).

The traffic metrics for mirror sites, such as fra.mobileapiru.com, rank second in visit numbers after the official domain. This site predominantly targets France, where it garners 94.56% of its audience. Other nations, including Canada (3.37%), Algeria (1.38%), and Thailand (0.49%), represent a minor share, reflecting limited geographical diversification, although it still maintains a global presence.

In comparison, rtenfrance.tv experiences considerably fewer visits than the previous two, , yet it remains focused on a French-speaking demographic, with 86.60% of visits originating from France and 13.40% from Spain.

Conversely, traffic data for the subdomain fr.rt.com, which is associated with the main rt.com domain, could not be retrieved from SimilarWeb. The domain xynovas.online, which was registered only in October 2024, recorded minimal traffic in December, with all visits originating from South Africa.

The official RT France website continues to attract the largest audience, primarily because there are no restrictive measures imposed outside the European Union. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that a significant portion of the audience across all domains is located in French-speaking nations, especially in France and Canada.

Research Findings: Dissemination of Identical RT France Materials Across Various Websites

The study led to the identification of multiple websites that consistently republish content from RT France, which can be found through Google search. We highlighted the following ratio regarding the number of publications in our sample (71 publications) compared to the number of republished items on these resources:

Not all resources identified in our research offered direct proof of their connection to Russian propaganda or pro-Russian networks. 

The main objective of our study is to illustrate the continued presence of RT France’s content within the EU information landscape. We specifically analyzed techniques such as the automatic reproduction of content across multiple platforms (for instance, aggregator websites), the dissemination of these publications via Russian or pro-Russian networks, and the utilization of this propaganda resource as an information source by other independent entities that are not Russian.

Examples of Duplicated RT France Publications (1)

Examples of Duplicated RT France Publications (2)

Pravda France, Pravda FR, and Pravda Macron  

The websites Pravda France, Pravda FR, and Pravda Macron are part of the structured and coordinated Russian network “Portal Kombat,” as reported by the French government agency Viginum in 2024. 

The “Portal Kombat” network, according to Viginum, comprises 193 websites. A significant number of these sites were established many years ago and remained dormant, while more than 50 have been launched since 2022.

The Viginum report indicates that these websites do not produce original news content; rather, they are intended to disseminate misleading information. Specifically, our analysis suggests that Pravda FR, Pravda France, and Pravda Macron primarily focus on redistributing content from Russian propaganda outlets, including Ukraina.ru, Kommersant, Newsfront, Lenta.ru, and RT.

Examples of Duplicated RT France Publications on the Websites of the “Portal Kombat” Network 

Furthermore, our investigation revealed multiple domains linked to the Pravda FR/Pravda France websites, including francais.news-pravda.com, france.news-pravda.com, fr.news-pravda.com, pravda-fr.com, and macron.news-pravda.com. These domains serve the purpose of expanding their audience reach and possibly evading access limitations.

Examples of Duplicated RT France Publications on the Websites of the “Portal Kombat” Network

The examination of the domains francais.news-pravda.com, fr.news-pravda.com, france.news-pravda.com, pravda-fr.com, and macron.news-pravda.com via the Whois service uncovers several significant elements that could suggest specific traits and intentions of these websites.

It is essential to note that four URL addresses—francais.news-pravda.com, fr.news-pravda.com, france.news-pravda.com, and macron.news-pravda.com—exhibit identical registration information. This observation implies that, despite their apparent differences, these addresses may belong to a singular infrastructure or network. Content modifications likely occur at the subdomain level, as these are subdomains of the primary domain news-pravda.com, while the registration details remain consistent. This arrangement enables the administrator to uphold a cohesive domain structure and oversee it from a central point.

The updated Viginum report as of April 2024 highlights the domain pravda-fr[.]com, which was registered on June 24, 2023. Our research also identified this domain (PRAVDA-FR.COM), with its creation date aligning with the findings in Viginum’s report. Furthermore, we uncovered an additional domain; the other four addresses are associated with NEWS-PRAVDA.COM, registered on May 23, 2024, indicating its recent establishment.

Moreover, the domain registrations were conducted through the Russian company Registrar of Domain Names REG.RU LLC, a common characteristic of entities linked to Russia or pro-Russian propaganda efforts. This registrar is frequently utilized for establishing websites that obscure ownership details. Indeed, the Whois data reveals that all contact information for the domain owners is concealed via the REG.RU privacy protection service, a practice typical of resources aiming to hide their true identity or location.

Another significant aspect is the employment of Cloudflare for hosting DNS servers (ara.ns.cloudflare.com and bryce.ns.cloudflare.com). This technology is widely used to mask the actual location of servers, provide protection against attacks, and bypass restrictions, thereby enhancing the resilience of such sites against blocking or sanctions. This further indicates that these sites are part of a comprehensive strategy to mitigate risks and maintain stable operations even under external pressures.

Consequently, the registration details of these domains suggest they possess the hallmarks of a standard infrastructure utilized for Russian disinformation campaigns. 

An analysis of website addresses via SimilarWeb facilitated the identification of primary URLs and their respective backup addresses. Overall, these web resources are targeted at a European audience, with the domains attracting the highest traffic in December (136,847 and 194,465 visits) primarily targeting France, which accounts for over 90% of the total audience.

Thus, one of the methods employed to disseminate propaganda content, such as that produced by RT France, involves the utilization of supplementary Russian networks like “Portal Kombat.” These networks comprise a multitude of websites functioning under diverse domains, enabling them to circumvent international limitations. Consequently, Russia maintains an uninterrupted stream of manipulative information that aligns with its political and strategic objectives.

Aggregator Websites

News aggregator websites serve as online platforms that systematically gather news content from a variety of sources, including news websites, blogs, social media, and other resources. They also represent an additional avenue for disseminating content from RT France.

Newsnet.fr. An illustrative example within the French-speaking information landscape is Newsnet.fr. As per Whois data, the domain newsnet.fr was registered in France on June 8, 2018, through the registrar OVH and continues to be operational. According to SimilarWeb, the primary audience is located in France, although the website experiences minimal traffic, with only 646 visits recorded in December. In contrast to the situation in France, there were access issues when attempting to open this resource in Belgium.

Examples of Duplicated RT France Publications on the Newsnet.fr 

Additionally, it is important to highlight the pro-Russian discourse present in the content disseminated by this website. A closer examination reveals that it not only shares materials from RT, a Russian propaganda outlet under EU sanctions but also provides links to other sources affiliated with networks that promote pro-Russian and anti-Western viewpoints.

List of sources for the Newsnet.fr website

For example, the Strategic Culture Foundation (SCF), whose content is actively redistributed by Newsnet.fr, is considered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury to be one of the key elements of Russia’s disinformation campaign aimed at undermining democratic processes in the United States. This organization was identified as a tool of Russian foreign intelligence. The U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on SCF under Executive Order 13848, which provides measures against foreign interference in U.S. elections. These sanctions resulted in the freezing of its assets and prohibited American individuals from engaging in financial transactions with the organization.

France News serves as another instance of an aggregator website. This website is affiliated with the Shafaqna News Network.

In terms of its content distribution, a report by the Alliance for Securing Democracy indicates that the Shafaqna News Network frequently disseminates materials from RT and TASS, utilizing RSS feed technologies to compile news articles. The network encompasses over 65 countries and offers content in multiple languages, including French, Arabic, Urdu, and Russian. Although the site asserts its independence from political influences, research suggests it plays an active role in promoting Russian propaganda.

Data from SimilarWeb reveals that in December 2024, the majority of the site’s audience was based in France (94.35%), with a minor portion from Italy (5.65%).

Screenshot of Identical RT France Publications on the France News Website

Screenshot of Identical RT France Publications on the France News Website

Aggregator websites primarily focus on collecting and disseminating content from multiple sources; however, they also could serve as an alternative means of distributing RT content within the information landscape of the EU. This approach facilitates the circumvention of official limitations, broadens the audience reach, and sustains influence over public sentiment in the area.

French-language websites focused on African countries

Our analysis identified several websites that frequently disseminate RT France content. These platforms include Ebene Media (registered in Reykjavik), Sosedo News (Cotonou, Benin), Sahafa Lyoum (France), and Echosmedias (Mali).

What unites these platforms is their primary thematic and audience focus on African countries. On the one hand, this enables RT’s French-language content to reach not only European audiences (notably, these sites are also accessible within the information spaces of France and Belgium), but also serves as an additional vehicle for disseminating RT’s content far beyond the European Union to French-speaking countries.

Examples of Duplicated RT France Publications on the French-speaking websites focused on African countries

However, these websites may also directly influence the population of France. According to the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), as of 2023, France was home to 7.3 million immigrants, representing 10.7% of the total population. Furthermore, as of 2023, 47.7% of immigrants in France were born in Africa, with Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia being the most common countries of origin. As a result, the content of these websites may also resonate with audiences in France.

Meanwhile, according to SimilarWeb, the majority of Echosmedias’ audience is based in France, whereas Sahafa Lyoum’s audience is distributed across the Middle East, North Africa, and the United States (with Morocco accounting for 34.21%, Saudi Arabia 16.26%, the United Arab Emirates 7.86%, India 6.53%, and the United States 6.49%). No audience data was available for Ebene Media and Sosedo News.

Ebene Media. A study by DRF Lab found that Ebene Media TV primarily publishes articles about France, Russia, Ukraine, and the West. The majority of the website’s articles are not original; instead, they are republished from various French-language news sources, including Russian state-controlled propaganda outlets such as RT France and Sputnik Afrique. As a result, these articles frequently feature pro-Russian and anti-French rhetoric.

Source: DRF Lab. Ebene Media TV publishes copied articles from RT, Footmercato, Slate, and Sputnik

During our research, access to this resource was inconsistent. Specifically, it was problematic in France (although identical RT France publications were indexed in Google search results), while the resource was accessible without restrictions in Belgium. The DRF Lab report described a similar situation. The homepage of ebene-media.com was not functioning, although the link to the website’s news section remained accessible (as of July 2024).

Examples of Duplicated RT France Publications on the Ebene Media website

Although we did not find direct links to Russian networks in the following resources, our analysis of their content reveals consistent reposting of RT France material across their pages.

For instance, the Sosedo News platform, as discovered in our analysis of publications, not only regularly reposts identical RT France content but also synchronizes the timing of content releases on both platforms.

Examples of Duplicated RT France Publications on the Sosedo News website

According to its description, Sosedo News is “an information platform about Benin and the world.” Whois data shows that it is registered in Cotonou, Benin, a country in West Africa.

RT France content is consistently reposted by the resources Sahafa lyoum and Echosmedias.

Sahafa lyoum is a news aggregator that collects and publishes content from various sources, including RT and Sputnik. The website primarily focuses on topics related to the Middle East and North Africa, covering countries such as Algeria, Egypt, the UAE, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and others. SimilarWeb data confirms that this media outlet not only focuses on topics related to the Middle East and North Africa but also has a significant audience in these regions.

List of information sources for Sahafa lyoum

Reposting of RT France Content on Sahafa lyoum 

Echosmedias is a media platform primarily focused on news and analysis related to African countries. A search for “Source: RT en français” on the site reveals numerous articles reposted from RT.

According to Whois, the site is registered in Mali, a country in West Africa. However, SimilarWeb identifies France as the primary audience for this resource.

Reposting of RT France Content on Echosmedias 

Although we cannot establish a direct connection to Russian networks through these resources, the reposting of content on such platforms creates an additional space for spreading Russian propaganda, enabling it to reach a broader audience. This increases the potential to influence public opinion in various regions.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The results of our research further confirm that, despite the official EU ban and sanctions, RT France’s content continues to circulate within the European information space through alternative mechanisms, including mirror sites, alternative domains, and news aggregators. This demonstrates how Russian propaganda adapts to evolving conditions and establishes an infrastructure supporting disinformation campaigns aimed at influencing public opinion both within Europe and beyond.

The continuation of such information operations threatens the EU’s information security and necessitates decisive and coordinated measures. The steps taken in the case studies described in this material have already proven effective and remain valuable in the fight against the spread of Russian propaganda within the EU:

• Sanctioning media outlets that actively disseminate disinformation serves as an effective tool for countering manipulation in the information space, as evidenced by the 2022 sanctions against RT and other Russian media.
• The systematic expansion of sanctions targeting media outlets that actively support or disseminate disinformation is a crucial step in ensuring the stability of the EU’s information environment, as demonstrated by the freezing of RT France’s funding and assets, which curtailed its operations and resulted in the closure of its office in France.

Further effective countermeasures should focus on enhancing both technical blocking mechanisms for banned resources and detecting and dismantling emerging disinformation networks. Specifically, this includes:

• Strengthening monitoring mechanisms and ensuring strict enforcement of sanctions, particularly by blocking access to propaganda outlets through national internet providers.
• Developing advanced technological tools and methodologies for detecting disinformation networks. Leveraging tools to trace connections between accounts, websites, and domains that repost or broadcast propaganda materials will help identify and dismantle such networks at an early stage.
• Eliminating alternative routes for distributing content from sanctioned resources.
• Promoting media literacy among EU citizens by encouraging critical analysis, source verification, and fact-checking through reliable resources. Fostering a culture of consuming information from trusted and verified sources to counter foreign manipulation attempts.

These measures not only strengthen information security but also enhance the resilience of European society against hostile information influences, which is crucial for protecting democratic processes and improving the information environment within the EU.