“Russia is part of the family for Africa, because we have the same history,”

Ibrahim Traoré, head of Burkina Faso’s military junta, 

at the Russia-Africa Summit (July 2023)

It is not the first year that Russia is trying to extend its influence in Africa. Moreover, this topic is becoming “hot” in Ukrainian infospace as well – in October 2023, the Center for Countering Disinformation under the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine published a report on Russian disinformation in Africa, which, among others, promotes the following narratives: ‘Russia contributes to global food security and is a reliable trade partner for Africa’, ‘The West is a colonizer and imperialist’, ‘The West provoked a war with the Russian Federation and continues to foment it’. 

On the other hand, the Russian foreign broadcaster Sputnik regularly holds teleconferences with the African media on how the Russian Federation should deepen media cooperation with African countries. Moreover, the Arabic division of Russia Today (RT) was launched back in 2007 and became the first regionally-focused branch of the holding company – long before RT UK (2014), RT America (2010), RT France (2017), RT en Español (2009) and RT Deutsch (2014). In the current context of sanctions restrictions on broadcasting in the US and EU, the two main foreign broadcasters of the Russian Federation, RT and Sputnik, are shifting their attention to other countries, particularly African countries. In addition to the media dimension, there is arms trade, Russia-Africa summits, cultural diplomacy through Rossotrudnichestvo (Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation), nuclear cooperation, educational exchanges, and eventually the use of private military companies on the continent for various tasks.

Before directly reviewing Russian foreign broadcasting in Africa, it will be useful to understand how Russian politicians and experts perceive the continent in general, what place they assign to it in their foreign policy strategy and what obstacles they see for their own goals.

Scene of the Russia-Africa Summit, July 2023 (Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, Wikimedia Commons)

The most relevant top-level document describing the Russian Federation’s strategy in Africa is the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum Action Plan 2023-2026 – a document adopted as a result of the Russia-Africa Summit in July 2023. During the summit, the parties also signed one final and three sectoral declarations, one of which concerns information security. The “Plan” has a separate section ‘Mass Media’ and envisages the consolidation of a contractual legal framework for cooperation, expansion of institutional ties, trainings for African journalists and media students, deepening cooperation with the African Broadcasting Union, as well as personnel exchange and joint participation in expert events. The declaration on cooperation in the field of information security is more general in nature, and the parties agreed to hold a specialized Russia-Africa meeting, which will focus on “security in the use of information and communication technologies”.

The views of the expert community are reflected in the analytical report “Russia and Africa: An Audit of Relations” from the Valdai Discussion Club. Based on votes in the UN General Assembly, the club identifies three groups of African countries depending on their proximity to Russia. Although the authors point out that one should not ‘absolutize’ the UN General Assembly votes, they do draw two conclusions from this fact: “…our analysis allows us, first, to formally record the lack of unity among African countries with respect to Russia. And, secondly, we can conclude that those 19 countries that have never voted in favor of continuing cooperation with Russia are open to it in the first place (meaning the anti-Russian resolutions in the UN General Assembly since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine – author’s note). These countries seem to be the nucleus for further promotion of Russia’s dialog with the countries of the continent.” The full list of these countries is as follows: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Guinea, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, CAR, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia and South Africa.

The views of the Russian media environment, namely Viktoriia Budanova, Head of the Africa Department at Sputnik, were presented at the Conference “Russia-Africa: Media Cooperation”: “Cooperation between African and Russian media is great … We have more than 20 partnerships with African media … The African continent is mentally very close to us, despite the geographical distance.”

Participants of the first Russia-Africa Summit, October 2019 (South African Government, Flickr)

Russia’s traditional media in Africa

Summit 1.0: Intention. In 2019, at the first Russia-Africa Summit, Aleksei Volin, then Deputy Minister of Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation, stated the readiness of Russian RT and TASS to “exchange information,” “provide news stories, analytical programs, documentaries,” and even to “host African journalists so that they can take advanced training courses.” Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia and Special Representative of the President of Russia for the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov said at the time that RT aimed to “cooperate with African news agencies in distributing RT content in English, French and Arabic.”

“Between the two summits”. The process of finding new audiences was organically accelerated by European Union sanctions and the subsequent complication of broadcasting in many Western countries due to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It was then that RT, Sputnik and other Russian media outlets began to integrate even more actively into Africa and beyond. They have reached some successes there. In 2023, RT established its first physical presence on the African continent by opening an office in Algeria. As of January 2024, RT Arabic’s Algerian subsidiary is working freely even on Facebook, although the agency’s main channels have been blocked on the platform. In 2023, the Sputnik Africa application was launched in the App Store and Google Play. In 2022, there was also news of a plan to open an RT studio in South Africa. At the time of writing, the studio is not yet operational, but we cannot say that this plan has been abandoned for good. Between 2019 and 2023, 3 new “Russian Houses” (a kind of “cultural embassies” of the Russian Federation in different countries) were opened in Africa, in addition to 8 existing ones – in Mali, Algeria and Sudan. In early 2024, the head of Rossotrudnichestvo Yevhenii Primakov said that the organization intends to open “Russian Houses” in new countries and expand its presence in those where they already exist. Also, during the period between the two summits, SputnikPro schools were held; these are journalistic trainings that geographically cover many countries, including African ones. Moreover, in 2023, the school held a thematic session entitled “Russia and Africa: the Unchanging, the Changing, and the New” as part of the InteRussia scholarship program from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations.

Summit 2.0: Expanding Horizons. Before the start of the media forum within the second Russia-Africa Summit, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov addressed the participants with the words: “I am pleased to state that Russian news agencies and TV channels are successfully carrying out professional activities on the African continent. Their news reports, feature films and documentaries are invariably in demand among the multi-million audience of Africans”. It is difficult to really measure the influence of Russian foreign broadcasting on the vox populi of African countries’ inhabitants with regard to Russia in general and its foreign policy in particular, but one thing is for sure: RT, Sputnik and partly TASS wasted no time and promoted their own narratives to an audience that could potentially be favorable to Russian messages: Anti-Western rhetoric wrapped in imaginary “anti-colonialism” from “a country that never had colonies.” Even the already mentioned Valdai in its “audit of Russian-African relations” points out that “a constant reminder of Russia’s non-involvement in the colonization of Africa” serves as an important political basis for the further development of interaction with Africa. Nevertheless, at least one “barometer” of public opinion does exist: In June 2023, Ipsos published the results of a survey of a sample of African countries, including the continent’s top economies: Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa. And it is important for Ukraine that the majority of people in these countries see Russia as an aggressor, but another conclusion from this survey is that there is a large number (10-15%, sometimes even more) of people who have not yet chosen a clear position regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war. And it is the opinion of this group of people that may pose the biggest threat to Ukraine.

A media forum was held as a separate block as part of the Russia-Africa Summit 2023. It mainly discussed the challenges of cooperation between Russia and Africa: “the collective West”, “the economy of sanctions and its impact on media partnership”, “new media formats of the Global South”, etc. The list of participants is impressive: Media professionals from Congo, Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Algeria, Namibia, Uganda, Senegal, Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mali, Comoros Islands, as well as members of interstate media associations came to visit the forum. They also achieved certain results: For example, Sputnik has managed to forge new partnerships forge new partnerships with agencies from Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania, Kenya and Uganda. These partnerships mean sharing content and mutual coverage of certain issues. For example, these agencies could potentially become mouthpieces for rebroadcasting Russian propaganda about the Russian-Ukrainian war.

There are also various university-based events dedicated to the exchange of experience between Russian and African media. For example, the Lomonosov Moscow State University hosted two round tables for RT, Sputnik and TASS employees and African media professionals. As a result of the event, the participants came to the conclusion that it is important to have a common information platform between Russia and Africa. In general, the topics of the roundtables chime with the points of the “Action Plan” mentioned above: integration and strengthening of cooperation with regional actors ostensibly to increase mutual “awareness”. Shortly before the Russia-Africa Summit, the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia hosted a media forum with the same name, which, according to the organizers, brought together 200 journalists from 35 African countries. They also talked about the exchange of experience and information cooperation, as well as the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.

According to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), television covers 42% of households in Sub-Saharan Africa (about 100 million households). If the population of North Africa is added to this number, it could reach 150-170 million households. Currently, all African countries can watch RT through satellite television – the channel transmits the signal mainly via the Egyptian Nilesat satellites for northern Africa and via Russian Express satellites for the rest of the continent. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 11 of the 55 African Union countries were able to watch RT on cable television. Another 11 countries had access to the channel through various regional online services. One of Africa’s largest streaming services, StarTimes (with 27 million users in 30 countries across the continent), added RT to its catalog in spring 2022. However, in February 2023, news broke of RT’s disconnection on that service – the company rebroadcast RT via the Dutch satellite SES-5 which shut down the broadcast. This reduces the number of countries from 11 to 4: Cameroon, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Ghana. Whether StarTimes has found an alternative to restore RT in the form of the aforementioned satellites is unknown. RT also states on its resources that StarTimes is the sole provider of the channel on cable TV for Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia, but there is no information about the disconnection of the cable signal, so it is unknown if the number of countries with the ability to watch RT via “cable” has changed.

Russian Foreign Broadcasting: Social Media

Russian foreign broadcasting is active on social media. Although Meta and X blocked RT’s and Sputnik’s main pages on their platforms at the time of the start of the full-scale Russian invasion, two years later the situation looks somewhat different: X has restored the profiles of these agencies (the main pages of RT and Sputnik are verified with 3.1 million and 376 thousand followers, respectively). Meta has not restored the blocked pages, but RT’s Algerian and Egyptian divisions are still present on Facebook with 500k and 1 million followers, respectively. On the one hand, this audience is relatively small when compared to, for example, Al Jazeera (28 million followers), which also targets North Africa, or the Egyptian publication “Day” (27 million). On the other hand, the French media Africanews has 235,000 followers; the largest Algerian newspaper Echorouk has 2.8 million followers. Accordingly, these regional pages of RT have their niche among the local audience and can influence the opinion of the population in a certain way. Agency employees are also represented on the platform: Yasmine Moussous, head of the Algerian office, or former Middle East bureau chief Paula Slier (according to her LinkedIn, profile, she resigned in May 2023).

There are many publicly available reviews of Russian disinformation on social media targeting African users, the most comprehensive of which is a mapping of major disinformation campaigns in Africa between 2014 and 2022 from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a think tank under the U.S. Department of Defense. It contains campaigns with Russian “roots,” such as “bot farms” with identical anti-French publications in Cameroon, CAR, DR Congo and other French-speaking African countries; campaigns to support Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in its fight against the central government and discredit it as a “U.S. puppet”; and to justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to audiences in Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa.

Let’s take a closer look at new cases of disinformation that occurred after the publication of the mentioned mapping or were not included in the list, namely Burkina Faso and Chad.

Ibrahim Traoré, head of the Burkina Faso junta (Lamine Traoré, Voice of America)

Burkina Faso. The country experienced two military coups in 2022: one in January and one in September. After the first “attempt”, rallies in support of the junta began in the streets of the country’s capital, Ouagadougou, with demonstrators waving Russian flags and chanting “Long Live Russia!” In September, as a result of disagreements within the junta, a group led by a young, energetic Captain Ibrahim Traoré – who had previously participated in the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali and in the suppression of an Islamist uprising in Burkina Faso – came to power. A year later, in July 2023, at the Russia-Africa summit, Traoré will thank Putin for the initiative of free grain transfer and declare that it is necessary to build partnership relations with the Russian Federation, because it meets the needs not only of the Burkinabe people, but also of the entire population of Africa.

Why so? Back in 2021, a strong of pro-Russian and anti-French sentiment emerged in Burkina Faso’s infospace, spreading through social media and significantly impacting the country throughout 2022. The methods of spreading disinformation varied: the use of AI-generated videos of non-existent people speaking out in support of the country’s military; creation of cartoons in which PMC Wagner mercenary crushes a rat, which symbolizes French influence in Burkina Faso; Facebook ads launched by non-authentic pages with content either in support of the junta or mocking France. In general, “media” and “NGOs” masquerading as local institutions operated freely for some time in Burkina Faso’s infospace via Facebook. According to the investigation of All Eyes on Wagner (OSINT-project that monitors the activities of PMC Wagner and affiliated organizations), many of the mentioned “media” and “NGOs” were funded through structures related to PMC Wagner. Their activity often had signs of networking – they simultaneously published certain news, made certain appeals and the like. This activity was amplified by the voices of local influencers – African Digital Democracy Observation notes that during 2022 in Africa there was an increase in the activity of pro-Russian influencers, who have a large reach – some “political review” videos gain as many as 500 thousand views. As a result of the political changes of the last two years, in February 2023, the French military contingent left the country, and in January 2024, Russian military instructors came to Burkina Faso to “help patrol dangerous areas”..

Chad. The Central African country is entering a turbulent year – the country will have both parliamentary and presidential elections this year. Chad is also home to a French army base on the one hand, and on the other – the country is “clamped” by the war in Sudan from the east, where the Russian Federation has its own interest in supporting the Rapid Support Forces, and Niger from the west, where a military coup took place in July 2023, and in the streets of Niamey, the capital of the country, people appeared with Russian flags and relevant slogans – a situation similar to that of Burkina Faso. The geopolitical ‘cocktail’ is further complicated by internal political instability, including military conflict in the southern regions and a weak economy – Chad has one of the lowest GDP per capita in Africa.

Meanwhile, what’s happening on Chad’s social media? Significant effort is being directed at the country’s audience by pro-Russian African influencers, including Nathalie Yamb. The Center for Countering Disinformation under the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine once wrote about her in the context of promoting pro-Russian narratives in the West regarding support for Ukraine.. Ms. Yamb is engaged in similar activities in relation to African countries, advocating the reduction of France’s presence on the continent and the expansion of cooperation with Russia. For example, she argues that French President Emmanuel Macron is to blame for the security challenges for Chad. This message was picked up by various inauthentic profiles on Facebook and X and people began to share it in an online scenario – copying the same text and publishing it on the platforms. Another tactic to manipulate public opinion was an anonymous post purporting to be from a fighter of the Front for Change and Concord in Chad, a rebel organization that seeks regime change in the country. The text of the post indicated that it was France that allegedly supports Chad’s “dictatorial regime” and is to blame for the problems facing the country – rhetoric similar to that mentioned by Ms. Yamb. This could look like an internal conflict, but there are two variables in parallel: first, Chad’s Front for Change and Concord fighters have been trained at military bases under the control of PMC Wagner in Libya; second, the main beneficiary of political change in Francophone Africa in recent years has so far been Russia alone (and these are the military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger).

 Африканський ландшафт протидії дезінформації

У країнах Африки існує ряд організацій, які займаються протидією дезінформації. Більше того, деякі з них з’явилися не “вчора” та демонструють інституційну сталість. Одна з найбільш помітних і комплексних організацій – Code for Africa з Кенії, яка створена у 2012 та позиціонує себе як найбільша в Африці ініціатива в сфері civic tech, технології як людського блага. За підтримки цієї організації існують дві важливі ініціативи з протидії дезінформації: African Fact-Checking Alliance, який об’єднує 240 медіа в 20 країнах континенту, та African Digital Democracy Observatory. Остання регулярно публікує матеріали про російську дезінформацію в африканському інфопросторі. З нещодавніх матеріалів: про “Африкасньку ініціативу” – російське медіа, покликане ще більше поширювати вплив РФ у Африці; про інфопростір Нігера після військового перевороту 2023 року та проросійський контент у ньому. Також, існує організація Africa Check, яка має офіси в Сенегалі, Нігерії та Кенії і меншою мірою висвітлює російську дезінформацію. Іншим проєктом на кшталт Africa Check є PesaCheck, який доступний не лише англійською та французькою мовами, а й мовою суахілі. Крім суто фактчекінгових проектів у багатьох країнах континенту є громадські організації, пов’язані з медіаграмотністю та роботою медіа загалом. Яскравий приклад – нігерійська Dubawa, яка має країни Західної Африки за цільову аудиторію. Серед результатів роботи організації – спростування тези про нібито побитих африканців на українсько-польському кордоні на початку повномасштабного вторгнення РФ (насправді це кадри з табору для біженців в іспанському місті Мелілья) та викриття мережі проросійських акаунтів у TikTok, які поширюють дезінформацію на франкомовні країни Африки. 

Наявність таких ініціатив украй важлива в нестабільній інформаційній екосистемі Африки, адже це місцеві експерти з локального контексту, а не французькі, американські чи будь-які інші “західні” організації, контент від яких може за замовчуванням сприйматися якщо не вороже, то, як мінімум, холодно та з підозрою. Адже, за словами Деніеля Калінакі, генерального директора угандійського підрозділу Nation Media Group – одного з найбільших незалежних медіа Центральної та Східної Африки, проросійському контенту простіше знайти шлях до африканської аудиторії, бо “якщо росіяни кажуть людям в Африці, що вони їх не колонізували, то людям на Заході складно навести такий самий аргумент”. Подібний аргумент працює і на користь іншого антизахідного гравця на континенті – Китаю.

Висновки/рекомендації

Взаємодія громадського сектору. Африканські країни мають багато експертних осередків громадянського суспільства в частині фактчекінгу, протидії дезінформації та медіаграмотності – це і спростування фейків, і проведення шкіл і тренінгів для місцевих медіа, і поширення результатів власних досліджень. Цим організаціям не вистачає нетворкінгу між собою, адже велика кількість проєктів майже ніяк не взаємодіє один з одним. Більше того, тема російської дезінформації не нова і для країн Східної Європи – України, Польщі, Чехії, Молдови тощо. Відповідно, обмін досвідом між громадськими організаціями може принести результат у вигляді, як мінімум, підвищення обізнаності одне про одного та перешкод для поширення російського впливу в Африці. Ба більше, спорадичні спроби вже є місце: наприклад, African Digital Democracy Observatory у жовтні 2023 року опублікувала переказ статті про Російську Православну Церкву як проксі-інструмент держави для збільшення власного впливу на фоні активізації РПЦ в Уганді.

Адвокація на рівні асоціацій. Крім Африканського Союзу в Африці існує багато регіональних і секторальних об’єднань. Наприклад, існує Африканський Союз Телерадіомовлення – об’єднання асоціацій мовників усіх країн континенту. Через подібні організації шляхом дискусій, круглих столів, тренінгів або будь-яких інших заходів можна було би поширювати “український погляд”. І особливо важливо обирати правильний тон для цього, адже активна підтримка України західними країнами вже може ставати “червоною ганчіркою” для багатьох африканців. Тож важливо дати зрозуміти, що сучасна російсько-українська війна має виразний антиколоніальний характер, а Україна не є “маріонеткою в руках західного неоколоніалізму та імперіалізму”.

Просвіта про колоніальні витоки сучасної РФ. Це один з ключових елементів демонтажу “антиколоніального” образу, який РФ “продає” країнам Африки. Є сенс інструменталізувати не тільки історію країн, які стали незалежними після розпаду СРСР, а і тих народів, які залишаються в складі РФ, адже історія цих територій має натуральний колоніальний характер – це в першу чергу народи Уралу, Сибіру, Надволжя та регіонів Крайньої Півночі, які протягом багатьох років стикалися з обмеженнями мови, культури та у більш широкому сенсі – ідентичності.

Модерація соціальних мереж. Платформи на кшталт Facebook чи X мають звертати більше уваги на модерацію шкідливого контенту в Африці, щоб стримати російський вплив у соціальних мережах. Ось, наприклад, відео з рекламою ПВК “Вагнер”, спрямоване на аудиторію в Малі, вже майже два роки тримається на Facebook та має 1.9 млн переглядів, хоча в інших локаціях з “більшою” модерацією контент про ПВК “Вагнер” часто прибирають, бо вона входить у “перелік небезпечних осіб чи організацій” Meta. А ось карикатурний мультфільм про Володимира Зеленського, який навесні 2023 року поширила сторінка “Русского Дома” в Танзанії, де експлуатуються два поширених наративи російської пропаганди – “президент-наркоман/алкоголік” та “мобілізація-м’ясорубка”. Відео супроводжується підписом, що В. Зеленський “продає життя за гроші”.

Державі. Наприкінці 2023 року міністр закордонних справ України Дмитро Кулеба затвердив першу в історії міністерства Комунікаційну стратегію України щодо країн Африки. У той самий час Україна відкрила посольство в Гані та планує це зробити ще в десяти країнах континенту, серед яких Руанда, Мозамбік і Ботсвана. За словами самого Д. Кулеби, Україна прагне розвивати відносини з Африкою “з повагою і на принципах взаємної вигоди”. Такий принцип дійсно варто використовувати як засадничий. Більше того, на риторичному рівні варто “перебороти” наратив РФ про “антиколоніальну” сутність її намірів на континенті та показати, що історія (ба більше – сьогодення) РФ мало чим відрізняється від “традиційних” колоніальних імперій – Франції, Великої Британії, Бельгії, Португалії, Німеччини чи Іспанії. Оптимізм викликає те, що керівництво МЗС України усвідомлює це як частину стратегії.

Прапор ПАР на проукраїнській демонстрації в Торонто, лютий 2022 року (Can Pac Swire, Flickr)